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THEY TOOK MY CHILD! AN EXAMINATION OF
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EMERGENCY
REMOVAL OF CHILDREN FROM PARENTAL
CUSTODY
Alyson Oswald'
When Katie Flanigan, a social worker, received a new case at noon on
Monday, her supervisor instructed her to investigate the possibilities of
child abuse and neglect.' Tommy Perella's schoolteacher had submitted
a report of suspected abuse. According to the report, the teacher noticed
frequent bruises on Tommy that he could not explain. Also, on the days
that Tommy's father picked him up from school, Tommy showed
extreme anxiety from lunchtime through the end of the day, and recently
had begun making up reasons why he should stay late after school.
Based on these observations, the teacher suspected that Tommy's father
was the abuser. Ms. Flanigan researched Tommy's family history and
discovered that his father had a history of assault, battery, and drug use.
After conferring with her supervisor, at 2:00 p.m. the same day, Ms.
Flanigan went to the Perella's home to meet and talk with Tommy and
his parents.2 During the meeting Ms. Flanigan noticed that the house
+ The author wishes to thank her husband, Ryan, for his endless support, and her parents,
Barbara and Ted, for their encouragement. In addition, the author thanks Tom Mirisola,
Cathy Staples, and Fred Woods for teaching her how to write, and Helen Alvar6 for
advising her on this paper.
1. This paragraph contains a fictional fact pattern to illustrate how child protective
services workers sometimes respond to a complaint of child abuse or neglect. Not all
complaints of child abuse or neglect are investigated. Erin McCormick, Alarming
Breakdown in State Foster Care, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 2002, 2002 WL 4037015 ("A county
social worker must review the complaint to see if an investigation is needed.
Investigations are started for about 72 percent of complaints."). See CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVS. & OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y
FOR PLANNING EVALUATION, NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
SYSTEMS AND REFORM EFFORTS: SUMMARY REPORT, at http:aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/CPS-
status03/summary (May 2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT] (listing the ambitious
goals of child abuse investigation, including the determination of whether "a child can
safely live with his or her family, whether abuse or neglect has occurred, whether other
children in the family are victims of abuse or neglect, and whether there is a risk for future
abuse or neglect").
2. In some states, the response time for complaints to child protective services (CPS)
agencies varies according to the severity of the complaint. See, e.g., Michelle Hunter,
System Deserted Boy Before Father Did, Some Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Oct. 19, 2003, 2003 WL 60071003 (reporting that the Office of Community Service in East
Jefferson, Louisiana responds to investigation-worthy complaints in accordance with their
priority levels, and noting that emergency situations, including circumstances of child
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was in a state of disrepair. Ms. Flanigan suspected that Mr. Perella was
high on drugs during the entire meeting, and when she spoke to Mrs.
Perella privately about her husband and his record of drug use, Mrs.
Perella became very defensive and cut the conversation short with Ms.
Flanigan. In addition, Tommy appeared timid and nervous in front of his
father. After this meeting, Ms. Flanigan concluded that Tommy was in
imminent danger of abuse. She consulted with her supervisor and their
legal counsel, and the next day she removed Tommy from his parents'
home.
These hypothetical facts present the question whether state agents can
temporarily remove a child from his parents' custody under emergency
circumstances without first gaining judicial authorization. The answer
involves an analysis of the competing interests of the parents, the state,
the child, and the constitutional protection these interests receive under
Supreme Court precedent . Parents have a fundamental right to the care
and custody of their children.' The Supreme Court has recognized this
fundamental right of parents under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 Federal courts have interpreted the state's
interests to include a parens patrie interest in the welfare of the child,' as
abuse and neglect, receive an almost immediate response); Dan Weikel, The Region Citing
Injuries, Coroner Rules Death of O.C. Baby a Homicide, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, 2002
WL 2496628 (explaining that in Anaheim, California, the Social Service Agency's
response to a child abuse tip depends on the emergency response worker's risk and safety
assessment-if the worker determines that there is a "risk of immediate harm, the agency
can move for protective custody of the child"); cf Holley Gilbert, Washington Devises
Plan to Help Kids in Meth Homes, OREGONIAN, Sept. 18, 2003, 2003 WL 3831178
(describing the authority of law enforcement officers to remove children as soon as they
"bust" homes where the methamphetamine is cooked and how CPS workers then leave
the children with relatives on an emergency basis).
3. See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999) (defining emergency
circumstances as "circumstances in which the child is immediately threatened with harm").
"The mere 'possibility' of danger is not enough" to qualify as emergency circumstances.
Id. (citing Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1991)).
4. See infra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
5. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing the "fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Doe v. Kearney, 329
F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Parents have a fundamental right to the custody of their
children.").
6. See supra note 5.
7. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67 (describing the state's parens patrie interest as
one that seeks to preserve and promote the welfare of the child); see also Tenenbaum, 193
F.3d at 593-94 ("[T]he State has a profound interest in the welfare of the child, particularly
his or her being sheltered from abuse."); Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733-39 (10th Cir.
1997) (asserting that the state's parens patrie interest in the child constrains the parental
"liberty interest in the custody, care, and management" of the child). See generally THE
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well as administrative and financial costs associated with emergency
removal procedures." Finally, under federal case law, the child's interests
include a welfare interest to be free from abuse and neglect, 9 and at the
same time a due process right to remain with his natural parents free
from unnecessary third party intervention."'
In the context of emergency removal of children, the circuits reconcile
these constitutional interests differently." For example, in Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 2 the Second Circuit held that the parents' procedural due
process rights require social workers to consider whether there is
sufficient time to obtain a court order prior to effecting an emergency
removal of a child from parents' custody. 3 In Doe v. Kearney,4 the
Eleventh Circuit held that whether an emergency removal comports with
due process does not hinge solely on whether there was time to obtain
judicial authorization, but on a variety of relevant factors presented in
the case."
This Comment examines the different ways the Second and Eleventh
Circuits analyze the constitutionality of temporary removal of a child
from parental custody in emergency situations, absent prior judicial
authorization. It first discusses the Supreme Court's recognition of
parents' fundamental right to care for their children and the protection
this right receives under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Comment then presents prior federal case law
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT FATALITIES: STATISTICS AND INTERVENTIONS, available at
http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf (updated on June 11, 2004) (offering
discussion and statistics on the state's interest in preventing child abuse and neglect
fatalities).
8. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (listing financial and administrative burdens as two
state interests at stake in parental rights termination proceedings).
9. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights.")
10. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816. 844-45
(1977) (declaring the right of children to maintain uninterrupted the "emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association" with the parent): see also
Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus
Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1247-48 nn.178-82 (1994) (listing various Supreme Court
cases that sanction minors' fundamental rights, including a juvenile's right to due process).
11. See infra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text.
12. 193 F.3d 581 (2nd Cir. 1999).
13. Id. at 596.
14. 329 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 1296-99. These factors include the "state's reasonableness in responding to
[the perceived emergency and the] objective nature, likelihood, and immediacy of danger
to [the] child." 3 BNA-USLWSCT 199,2003.
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indicating that children may be temporarily removed from their parents'
custody without violating the parents' due process rights, as long as
sufficient grounds exist to believe that the child is in imminent danger of
abuse, i.e. emergency circumstances. Next, this Comment analyzes the
recent split between the Second and the Eleventh Circuits: the circuits
disagree over whether a case worker must demonstrate that there is
insufficient time to gain judicial authorization to effect a constitutional,
temporary removal of a child from parental custody. This Comment
critiques each circuit's opinion, drawing upon prior case law and public
policy to conclude ultimately that the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning is
more sound, and that insufficient time to gain judicial authorization
should not be an absolute requirement to constitutional emergency
removal.
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
A. The Supreme Court Recognizes Parental Rights
1. A Look at Parents' Substantive Due Process Rights
The Supreme Court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to confer certain procedural and substantive rights upon
U.S. residents.' 6 Among these substantive rights, in the area of parental
and family matters, the Court recognizes that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of
their children.' 7 Throughout the past eighty years, the Supreme Court
has developed a body of case law that continually reaffirms these
fundamental rights.'"
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,'9 the Court held that the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects parents' right to
"establish a home and bring up children. 20 In Stanley v. Illinois,2' the
16. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 720 (1997) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a substantive component that
"provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests"); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
17. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
18. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (confirming that "there is a
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children")
(citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
19. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20. Id. at 399. In Meyer, the Supreme Court rejected the extension of Nebraska's
"police power" through a blanket prohibition of instruction of modern languages in
schools. Id. at 396-403. The Court found that a state statute prohibiting the instruction of
a foreign language to a child who had not yet completed the eighth grade violated the
1164 [Vol. 53:1161
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Court stated that "[t]he private interest ... of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.""2 The Court affirmed that
the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition" in
214Wisconsin v. Yoder." More recently, in Troxel v. Granville,24 a majority
of the Supreme Court concluded that parents' liberty interest in the care
and custody of their children is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court."2 Drawing on Meyer, Stanley,
Yoder, and other family law precedent, the Supreme Court in Troxel held
that parental determination of the child's best interests must be accorded
"special" or "material" weight in decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children. 6
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id.: see also id. at 400 ("[The instructor's]
right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we
think, are within the liberty of the Amendment."). A state may not arbitrarily interfere
with the liberty "to acquire useful knowledge," a right "long freely enjoyed," unless the
means by which it does so are narrowly tailored to eradicating a "harmful" emergency.
See id. at 399, 403.
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 651. In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court declared the children wards of
the State upon the death of their mother, based on the fact that the father and mother had
never been married. Id. at 646-47. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "as a
matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children were taken from him." Id. at 649. The Court reasoned that parents are
presumed "fit," and therefore act in the best interest of their children. Id. at 652, 657-58.
Under due process of law, all parents, wed and unwed, are entitled to a hearing on
parental fitness "when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of [a] family." Id. at 658.
23. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as the foundation for this "enduring American
tradition").
24. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
25. Id. at 65. The Troxel Court based its ruling on a body of Supreme Court
precedent that affirms parents' fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care
and custody of their children. Id. at 65-66.
26. Id. at 69-70 ("The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court
intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville's
determination of her daughters' best interests."). The Supreme Court criticized the lower
court's "fail[ure] to accord the determination of Granville. a fit custodial parent. any
material weight." Id. at 72.
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2. Substantive Fundamental Rights Receive Procedural Due Process
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Supreme Court precedent provides a two-step analytical framework
for assessing procedural due process challenges.27 First, the Court
examines whether an instrument of the government deprived a person of
28a fundamental right in the form of a liberty or property interest.
Second, if the Court determines that due process requirements arise, it
then examines how much process is due by balancing three factors: the
nature of the private interest that will be affected by the official action,29
the risk that one might be wrongly deprived of such interest through the
procedures used,"' and the costs and burdens of such procedures to the
government)' The development of this analytical structure was complete
by 1976.2
27. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (indicating that due
process challenges involve individuals deprived of '"liberty' or 'property' interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment").
28. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (applying due process
requirements only to liberty and property interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment). Due process protection also may apply to lesser rights, as long as these
lesser rights are tied to the fundamental rights of a property or liberty interest. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (finding that due process requirements apply
in the case of state termination of welfare benefits). Recognizing the vital nature of
welfare benefits, the Goldberg Court determined that the recipient acquired a property
interest in the form of a statutory claim of entitlement. Id. at 261-62, 262 n.8.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State must provide the welfare recipient with due
process protection in the form of a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. Id. at 264.
29. This Comment primarily focuses on the first factor. It addresses the second and
third factors only in the following footnotes. See infra notes 30-31.
30. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DECISION-MAKING IN UNSUBSTANTIATED CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CASES: A
SYNTHESIS OF RECENT RESEARCH, available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/focusl
decisionmaking.pdf, at 1 (June 2003) (stating that in 2000, nearly two-thirds of the
referrals received by child protective services were unsubstantiated). In this source,
"'substantiated' means an investigation by child protective services determined there is
reasonable cause to believe that the child has been abused or neglected. 'Unsubstantiated'
means an investigation determined no maltreatment occurred, or there was insufficient
evidence under state law or agency policy to conclude that the child was maltreated." 1d;
see also Brief for Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 13, Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581
(2d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-9488) ("in the State of New York. approximately two-thirds of the
complaints which the Register receives turn out, upon investigation, to be completely
groundless or 'unfounded,' i.e., not supported by any credible evidence whatsoever."
(citations omitted)).
31. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. In Matthews, the respondent received social
security benefits for four years while back problems and diabetes prevented him from
working. Id. at 323-24 n.2. Later, he was informed by mail of the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) conclusion that he was no longer disabled, and that the SSA
would terminate his benefits within a month. Id. at 324 n.2. Respondent filed suit, seeking
an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his benefits under Goldberg. Id. at 324-
1166 [Vol. 53:1161
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B. Prior to Tenenbaum, Circuits Sanctioned Removal Without
Authorization
Prior to Tenenbaum and Kearney, the Supreme Court lacked an
established framework for analyzing parents' constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the care and custody of children in the specific context
of emergency removal.3 Accordingly, federal case law in this area,
including Supreme Court precedent involving parents' due process rights,
provides the background for Tenenbaum and Kearney.34
In its 1977 decision, Duchesne v. Sugarman," the Second Circuit laid
the foundation for the "emergency circumstances" doctrine.36  In this
case, the State took children into custody without a court order after
their mother entered a psychiatric ward.37 The mother moved in and out
of the psychiatric hospital for twenty-seven months, while the State took
custody of the children without judicial authorization. The court found
that the initial removal of the children without a court order was
constitutional because emergency circumstances existed and due process
could be postponed. 39  The court acknowledged that the emergency
25; see supra note 28. The Court distinguished Goldberg, noting that "'a controversy over
eligibility [for welfare benefits] may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits,"' whereas eligibility for social security benefits is not based on
financial need or any other income the worker may have. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 340-41
(quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264). The Court opined that a "disabled worker's need is
likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient." Id. at 342. Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the administrative procedures in place for the termination of disability
benefits satisfied due process requirements without requiring a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 349.
32. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333-34 (discussing the Court's opportunity over the
years to evaluate "the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to
the deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is provided
thereafter").
33. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee and Appellants-Cross-
Appellees at 9, Tenenbaum (No. 97-9488). To this day, the Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue directly. Id.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 826-28.
37. Id. at 822. The mother left the children with a neighbor because she expected to
receive outpatient treatment at the hospital and return later that day. Id. However, she
was admitted and hospitalized for six days. Id. The neighbor with whom the mother left
the children contacted the authorities because she was unable to care for the children
herself. Id.
38. Id. at 822-24. After an extended separation from her children, the mother filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the New York Supreme Court. Id. at 824.
39. Id. at 826.
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circumstances doctrine is a unique exception to typical due process
analysis.
4
In Myers v. Morris,4 ' the Eighth Circuit interpreted parents' liberty
interest as "not absolute., 42  Myers appears to be a foundation for
Kearney, recognizing that "there [is no] legal precedent which suggests
that acting upon a reasonable belief that children are endangered by
continued presence in their homes must be deferred until the completion
of additional investigation. ' 43  The Myers court argued that the
government's compelling interest in protecting children limits the
parental liberty interest in keeping a family intact 4  Furthermore, in
Robison v. Via41 the Second Circuit noted that it was a "well established
fact" that state officials can remove children from parental custody prior
to gaining a court order when emergency circumstances exist. 6 By 1991,
the Second Circuit made it increasingly clear that a parent's liberty
interest in the care and custody of his or her child remained
constitutionally protected, and a parent could not be deprived of this
interest "without due process, generally in the form of a predeprivation
hearing.., except where emergency circumstances exist.
47
The Fourth Circuit in Weller v. Department of Social Services40 rejected
the contention that the State's emergency intervention into the custody
of the plaintiff's son violated his substantive due process rights.4 9 The
40. Id. (calling the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right without due
process an "extraordinary situation[]"). Further, the court determined that a parent's
liberty interest in the custody of her children demands the protection of due process once
the emergency circumstances cease. Id. at 826 (noting that "the constitutional
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard are not eliminated [in emergency
situations], but merely postponed"). In that case, any further retention of the child
requires judicial authorization in order to overcome a due process challenge. Id. at 828.
41. 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 1462. The court stated, "[t]he liberty interest in familial relations is limited
by the compelling governmental interest in protection of minor children, particularly in
circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents
themselves." Id.
43. Id. at 1463; cf Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming
that a state does not have to wait to gain judicial authorization in order to remove a child
from parental custody where there is "probable cause to believe the child is threatened
with imminent harm").
44. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462 (emphasizing the application of this limitation when
children require protection from their own parents).
45. 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987).
46. Id. at 921 ("'When a child's safety is threatened, that is justification enough for
action first and hearing afterward.'") (quoting Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F.
Supp. 1179, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1977)).
47. Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1991).
48. 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
49. Id. at 391.
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court stated, "[i]t does not shock the conscience to hear that defendants
removed a child in emergency action from the custody of a parent
suspected of abusing him, based upon some evidence of child abuse," and
upheld the emergency circumstances exception. As for the plaintiff's
claim that the State violated his procedural due process rights by twice
transferring custody of his son without a prior hearing, the court swiftly
stated that "Due Process does not mandate a prior hearing in cases
where emergency action may be needed to protect a child."'" Just as in
Duchesne, 2 the court found that Maryland's custody statutes were
constitutional, but held that Maryland's failure to provide post-removal
judicial review violated the father's procedural due process rights.
Cecere v. City of New York14 also recognized the emergency
circumstances doctrine." In 1992, Gina Cecere alleged that a supervisor
of the Office of Special Services for Children (SSC), various agencies of
the city of New York, and Cecere's mother, Elda Brown, violated
56Cecere's due process rights by taking away her daughter. Cecere's
mother had contacted the SSC and expressed concerns about Cecere's
drug and alcohol use, inability to care for the child, and suicidal
• 57
tendencies. After Cecere asked her mother to take and care for her
daughter, a SSC supervisor issued a letter to prevent Cecere from
regaining custody of the child until the SSC could begin proceedings in
family court.58 The Second Circuit found no due process violation
because the supervisor had an objectively reasonable belief that an
emergency situation existed. 59 The facts of Cecere, the court noted, "[fell]
within Duchesne's explicit recognition that temporary assertions of
custodial authority in the face of a reasonably perceived emergency do
not violate due process." 6
Jordan By Jordan v. Jackson,6 ' a 1994 Fourth Circuit case, reflects
further acceptance of the emergency circumstances doctrine.62 Parents
50. Id. at 391,393.
51. Id.
52. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); see supra text accompanying
notes 35-40.
53. Weller, 901 F.2d at 395-96 (remanding for a factual inquiry into whether
defendants deprived plaintiff of a post-deprivation hearing).
54. 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 829.
56. Id. at 827.
57. See id. at 827-28.
58. Id. at 828.
59. Id. at 829-30.
60. Id. at 830.
61. 15 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994).
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claimed that state authorities violated their constitutional rights by
removing their son when he was "never . . . in imminent danger of
irremediable harm.",63  The Jordans' main challenge focused on the
constitutionality of Virginia's statutory provisions that permit a delay of
several days before allowing judicial review of an emergency removal.6
For this article's purpose, however, the case's true significance resounds
in the parents' failure to challenge the Virginia code section providing for
the emergency removal of children without judicial authorization.6' The
62. Id. at 343. This case is about "the awesome and, regrettably, sometimes
necessary, power of the state to take custody of children from their parents in order to
protect the children from irreparable injury or death." Id. at 336. Today, even as some
states seek to reform child welfare systems, there appears a desire to leave the emergency
circumstances doctrine in place. See, e.g., Matthew Franck, Panel Backs Opening Foster
Care Hearings; Proposals Aim to Answer Criticisms of State System, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 3567305 (discussing several changes that the Missouri
Commission on Children's Justice seeks to make within the state's foster care system,
including "requir[ing] a team of state workers, child advocates and court officials to meet
before a child is removed from a home, except in emergencies") (emphasis added). The
Commission's intentional exclusion of emergency circumstances from a proposed
mandatory meeting before removal implies a continuing belief in the necessity of this
doctrine. See id.; see also Matthew B. Stannard, Baby's Father Charged With Murder/New
Foster Care Policies Might Have Saved Him, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31, 2002, 2002 WL
4039365 (detailing a series of reforms to the child welfare system in nine California
counties that will bring together foster parents, natural parents, case workers, and other
involved parties with a facilitator to make group decisions about a child's case, but under
which "case workers [will] still have sole discretion to act in emergencies-such as
deciding to remove a child from its home").
63. Jackson, 15 F.3d at 337. The Jordans were a married couple, parents, and both
worked full-time. Id. at 336. They had two daughters, ages three and six, who were in day
care and with babysitters when they were not in school. Id. The Jordans also had a son,
Christopher, age ten, who took care of himself after school, usually for an hour and a half.
Id. One day someone called the local Department of Social Services (DSS) and reported
that Christopher was home alone, before and after school, and had been fighting with
other kids at the bus stop. Id. DSS assigned the case to a social worker who, on the very
next day, without contacting the Jordans first to obtain any additional information, seized
Christopher as he was walking home from his school bus stop, pursuant to Virginia law,
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.9 (Michie Supp. 1993). Id. Three days later, DSS returned
Christopher to his parents. Id. at 337.
64. Jackson, 15 F.3d at 337.
65. Id. at 341-42 (emphasizing that the Jordans did not wish to challenge the statute
that authorizes the emergency removal of children). In addition to Virginia, forty-six
other states plus the District of Columbia have statutes that provide for the emergency
removal of children without a court order. ALA. CODE § 26-14-6 (1992); ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.142(a) (Michie 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821(B) (West Supp. 2003); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-516(a)(1) (Michie 2003); CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 306(a)(2)
(Deering 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-401 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-
101g(c) (West Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2309(a) (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(I)(b) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
45(a)(4) (2003); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-22(a) (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1612(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5 (West 2001); IND. CODE
1170 [Vol. 53:1161
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Jordans' decision to forego this constitutional challenge indicates a
possibly growing recognition and tolerance of the emergency removalS 66
exception.
In 1997, the Tenth Circuit in Hollingsworth v. Hill 7 affirmed the ability
of the state to remove children from parental custody without a court
order.6" The court described the purpose of two Oklahoma statutes, the
ANN. § 31-34-2-3(a) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.79(1) (West Supp. 2003);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1527(b) (2002): KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.040(5)(c) (Michie
Supp. 2002): LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 621 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN.. FAM. LAW § 5-
709(c) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 199, § 51B(3) (West 2003): MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.14(1) (West 2003): MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.175 (West 2003); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-303(i)(b) (2003): MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.125(2) (West 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-301(1) (Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-248(3) (1998): NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.390(i)(a) (Michie 2002): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:6(I) (2001); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.29(a) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-6(A)(1) (Michie 2003):
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417(1)(a) (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-500(a) (2002):
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1717.14 (Anderson 2001): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-
1.1(A)(1) (West Supp. 2004): 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324(3) (West Supp. 2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5(b), (d) (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-610(A)(1) (Law. Co-op.
2002): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-12(2), (4) (Michie 1999): TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-
113(3), -114(a)(2) (2001): TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104 (Vernon 2002): UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4a-202.1 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5510(3) (1991): VA. CODE ANN. §
63.2-1517(A) (Michie Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.050(1)(b) (West
2002): W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3(c) (2003): WIS. STAY. ANN. § 48.19(d)(5) (West 2003): WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-405(a)(i) (Michie 2003). State legislatures enacted these statutes so
that state workers and law enforcement officers can prevent harm from occurring when
they believe that a child is in imminent danger of abuse and neglect. Answer Brief of
Appellees at 23. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13874-B). These
statutes exist for situations where a state worker has probable cause to believe that a child
is in imminent danger of abuse or neglect, so that the worker can "act first and protect the
child and then ask the court to review what has been done." Id. (emphasis added). In
practice, courts approve the "act first, ask second" policy of state workers in cases where
children are suspected to be in imminent danger of abuse or neglect. See Caroll J. Miller,
Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute Allowing Endangered Child to Be
Temporarily Removed from Parental Custody, 38 A.L.R. 4th 756 (1985) (listing and
analyzing state and federal cases in which courts have validated statutes that permit
workers to temporarily remove children from parental custody when the child's health or
welfare is endangered). But cf ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL CHILD PROTECTIVE COURT
PROCESS, http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/usermanuals/courtsprotect.cfm (updated on
June 11, 2004) (noting that not all states allow the temporary emergency removal of
children without a court order).
66. See Jackson, 15 F.3d at 343 (noting appellants' concession that "it is well-settled
that the requirements of process may be delayed where emergency action is necessary to
avert imminent harm to a child," and citing case law from various circuits supporting this
proposition, including Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387. 393 (4th Cir. 1990) and
Duchesne v. Sugarman. 566 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1977)).
67. 110 F.3d 733 (10th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 739 (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)). This case
arose out of a dispute between spouses. Id. at 736. The day after an argument with his
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"Oklahoma Children's Code" and Oklahoma's "Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act, 6 9 as follows:
Under each statutory scheme, Oklahoma protects [the State's
interest in the safety of its children and the parents' interest in
the care, custody and management of their children] through
procedures designed to ensure both that parents whose children
are removed receive notice and an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," . . . and that
children are removed from parental custody in time to avoid
threats to their health and safety."
wife, Mr. Hollingsworth "obtain[ed] a victim's protective order that limited Ms.
Hollingsworth's legal contact with her husband and children." Id. While her husband was
obtaining the court order, Ms. Hollingsworth left home and took her children to a motel.
Id. Eventually, the police located Ms. Hollingsworth, served her with the protective order,
and removed her children from her custody. Id. at 736-37. Ms. Hollingsworth then sued
members of the police department alleging deprivation of her constitutional rights. Id. at
737-40 (noting that it was unclear to the court whether Ms. Hollingsworth intended to
allege violations under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, and deciding to analyze
both possible claims). Ultimately, the court determined that "the Oklahoma child abuse
law [did] not justify the removal of Ms. Hollingsworth's children without prior notice and
a hearing." Id. at 739. The court emphasized how "the record contain[ed] no evidence
that Ms. Hollingsworth posed an immediate threat to [her children's] safety," or that she
"actually endangered the welfare of her children prior to their removal." Id. at 739-40.
That is, although dicta indicated that "[u]nder appropriate circumstances," such sudden
removal might be constitutional, those circumstances were not present in this case. Id. at
739.
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1101-1149 (1998). The Oklahoma State Legislature has
rewritten and renumbered several sections of these statutes in recent years. The
Oklahoma Children's Code now appears in chapter 70 of title 10. Id. §§ 7001-1.1 to 7006-
1.5 (West Supp. 2004).
70. Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739 (citation omitted); see tit. 10, §§ 7001-7003; id. tit.
22, § 60-60.7. The pertinent subsection regarding "remov[al] from parental custody in
time to avoid threats to their health and safety," Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739, appears as
follows: "A. [A] child may be taken into protective custody prior to the filing of a petition:
1. By a peace officer or employee of the court, without a court order if the child's
surroundings are such as to endanger the welfare of the child." Tit. 10, § 7003-2.1. This
subsection was amended in 2002, adding the language "or if continuation of the child in
the child's home is contrary to the health, safety or welfare of the child." OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-1.1(A)(1) (West Supp. 2004). Unfortunately, even the additional
language does not help to clarify the scope of the statute. For example. what exactly are
"surroundings [that] endanger the welfare of the child?" OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7003-2.1
(1998). Which situations are "contrary to the health, safety or welfare of the child," and
which are not? OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-1.1(A)(1) (West Supp. 2004). Such loose
statutory language not only leaves social workers without a clear indication of what
constitutes exigent circumstances that warrant lawful emergency removal, but it also lends
no help to the judiciary when forced to review an immediate removal under this statute.
Some have argued that vague statutory language should be redrafted in order to decrease
the occurrence of defensive social work and unnecessary spontaneous removals. See, e.g.,
Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child
Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 463 (2003) (declaring that "[s]tates should
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Although neither statute provided for the lawful removal of Ms.
Hollingsworth's children, the court attempted to clarify the goals of the
statutes, and affirmed the validity of the emergency circumstances
doctrine.7' Two years later, the Second Circuit would dramatically depart
72from this doctrine in Tenenbaum v. Williams.
C. An Anomaly in the Law: Tenenbaum v. Williams
At the time of her removal, Sarah Tenenbaum was five years old.73
Sarah's teacher suspected abuse by Sarah's father and contacted theS• 74
proper authorities. Nat Williams, a supervisor for the Child Welfare
clarify that the 'imminent danger' required for emergency removal is an imminent risk of
serious physical injury or death"). Chill argues for such limiting language because he
believes that "[e]mergency removal is not a magic bullet but rather a dangerous, high-risk
tactic that should be employed as a last resort." Colin Poitras, DCF Steps up Child
Removals, Child Experts Fear Impact on Young, HARTFORD COURANT, June 20, 2003,
2003 WL 57365759 (quoting Paul Chill). However, Chill notes that "few states have
enacted such narrow substantive limits on emergency removal." Chill, supra at 464. In
fact, many state statutes contain strong limiting language such as "imminent danger" of
"physical harm" or "injury," or "immediate threat" to the child's "safety." See ALA.
CODE § 26-14-6 (1992) ("imminent danger to that child's life or health"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-101g(c) (West Supp. 2003) ("imminent risk of physical harm"); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907 (2003) ("imminent danger of suffering serious physical harm or a
threat to life"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(1)(b)(1) (West 2003) ("imminent danger of
illness or injury"); IDAHO CODE § 16-1612(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003) ("prompt removal is
necessary to prevent serious physical or mental injury"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.79(1)(a)
(West Supp. 2003) ("imminent danger to the child's life or health"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.040(5)(c) (Michie Supp. 2002) ("imminent death or serious physical injury"); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 210.125(2) (West 1996) ("imminent danger of suffering serious physical
harm or a threat to life"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:6(I) (2001) ("imminent danger
to the child's health or life"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.29(a) (West 2002) ("imminent
danger to the child's life, safety or health"); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417(1)(a) (McKinney
2003) ("imminent danger to the child's life or health"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-
12(4) (Michie 1999) ("imminent danger to the child's life or safety"); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1-114(a)(2) (2001) ("immediate threat to the child's health or safety"); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 262.104(1) (Vernon 2002) ("immediate danger to the physical health or
safety of the child"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1517(A)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003) ("imminent
danger to the child's life or health"); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3(c) (2003) ("imminent danger
to the physical well-being of the child"). The language in these statutes appears to
exemplify the "emergency circumstances" exception to normal due process. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, some of this language falls short according
to Chill, who demands the strictest of language in order to protect parents' rights. See
Chill, supra, at 463.
71. Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739-40.
72. See infra Part I.C.
73. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1999). Sarah suffered from
delayed development and elective mutism, communicating mostly by pictures and one or
two-word sentences. Id.
74. Id. One day at school, five-year-old Sarah slept during story-time and later
awoke crying. Id. When her teacher asked her if anyone hurt her, Sarah nodded "yes."
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Administration (CWA), received the Tenenbaum case at approximately
noon on Friday, January 5, 1990.15 That same day, a caseworker met with
Sarah's parents, examined Sarah for signs of abuse, and reported back to
Williams.76 However, Williams did not choose to remove Sarah from
school until Tuesday, four days later.77 Without obtaining parental
consent and without a court order, a caseworker removed Sarah from
school and took her to the local hospital, where a doctor performed a
gynecological examination to check for signs of sexual abuse.7" When the
doctors did not find any evidence of sexual abuse, CWA returned Sarah
to her parents, and eventually marked Sarah's case as "unfounded.
79
Sarah's parents sued, alleging multiple constitutional violations by the
State and its actors.s°
Id. The teacher then listed the names of several people in Sarah's life, and when she asked
Sarah if her father hurt her, Sarah nodded "yes" and began to cry. Id. Later, Sarah
indicated twice "where she was being hurt" by pointing to the groin area on a doll. Id.
Sarah's teacher chose not to report anything to the authorities that day. Id. However,
when Sarah's teacher asked her to explain a picture Sarah drew the next day, Sarah said,
"Sarah and ...Daddy kneeling, hurt." Id. Following this, Sarah's teacher decided to
report Sarah's behavior to her supervisors. Id.
75. Id. at 588-89.
76. Id. at 589. Despite the teacher's report of Sarah's communication about her
father hurting her, investigator James was unable to obtain similar information from Sarah
upon visiting her at school. Brief for Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 15-16, Tenenbaum
(No. 97-9488). When James questioned Sarah about the alleged abuse, Sarah did not
respond. Id. at 15. When James asked Murphy, Sarah's teacher, to recreate the events by
which Murphy obtained answers from Sarah, inconsistencies appeared. Id. at 15-16; id. at
16 (Sarah shook her head "no" when Murphy asked her, in front of James, if her father
hurt her). Nonetheless, the trial court eventually found that an emergency existed, despite
the child's claimed recantation before James. Id. at 42. The trial court also found "as a
matter of law, that the information provided by [Murphy] to James established reasonable
grounds for the emergency removal of Sarah. Accordingly, none of the defendants
violated a due process right of any of the plaintiffs." Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
77. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 590.
78. Id. at 591. Sarah had to wait several hours in the emergency room with the
caseworker. Id. Finally, Sarah received a gynecological examination. Id. The court
explained what happened to Sarah:
Sarah was stripped and subjected to a body cavity search, including an inspection
of her vagina and surrounding area, as well as penetration of her vagina and anus
with q-tips, all in the presence of James. That was the first time in her life that
Sarah had undergone a gynecological exam.
Brief for Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 16, Tenenbaum (No. 97-9488).
79. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 591.
80. Id. This Comment will focus on the Court's discussion of whether the State
violated Sarah's parents' rights to procedural due process.
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1. The Majority Opinion Adds a Brand New Requirement to the
Assessment of Due Process Challenges Resulting from Emergency
Removal of Children
On appeal, the Second Circuit began its constitutional analysis by
recognizing parents' fundamental right in the care and custody of their
children.' The court then acknowledged the emergency circumstances• 82
exception, but disagreed with the district court that emergency
circumstances existed in the case of Sarah's removal.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that evidence
suggested the CWA removed Sarah to check for possible signs of abuse,
not to remove her from an emergency situation. 8 The majority reasoned
that "a properly instructed jury" could conclude that there was sufficient
time to obtain a court order, and if there was sufficient time, then there
was no emergency.8 If there was no emergency, then a jury could
conclude that the State acted unconstitutionally by removing Sarah
without a court order. In an effort to prevent such an unconstitutional
removal from occurring again, the court handed down a bold,
unprecedented holding.87 The Second Circuit stated that "where there is
81. Id. at 593.
82. Id. at 594 ("In 'emergency' circumstances, a child may be taken into custody by a
responsible State official without court authorization or parental consent.") (citing
Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1991), and Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
83. Id. (recounting the district court's findings that Williams had "probable cause, i.e.,
an objectively reasonable basis, to believe emergency circumstances existed because 'the
substance of what the child communicated to [her teacher] . . . is essentially
uncontroverted, viz. that Sarah's father hurt her through contact with her vaginal area at
night"). The Second Circuit found that this was insufficient information to rule as a
matter of law that emergency circumstances existed, permitting a constitutional emergency
removal. See id.
84. Id. at 595.
85. Id. But see id. at 608-11 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the effect of the
majority's new rule, which places the subjective decision of whether there was time for the
caseworker to obtain a court order in the hands of the jury). Judge Jacobs disagrees with
taking the objective decision of whether an emergency exists out of the determination of
the trial judge. See id. at 610 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) ("Ordinarily, a judge would
have little trouble ascertaining as a matter of law that the child welfare worker faced an
emergency, objectively considered."). Judge Jacobs further disagrees with placing this
determination into the hands of the jury, which, under the majority's new rule, requires
the jury to answer subjective questions such as, "[w]as there time [to obtain a court order]
in this case?," and "[h]ow long does it take?" Id. at 608 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part). He
rejects the majority's view that "a properly instructed jury" could answer these types of
questions with any consistency. Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part).
86. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 595. But see id. at 608 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part); see
also supra note 85.
87. Id. at 596 (admitting that "not until today [has the court] specifically held" that
state workers must consider whether there is sufficient time to gain a court order before
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reasonable time consistent with the safety of the child to obtain a judicial
order, the 'emergency' removal of a child is unwarranted. The
practical effect of this holding is that, in the Second Circuit, state workers
must determine that there is insufficient time to gain a court order before
effecting an emergency removal of a child."9
2. The Dissent Laments the Departure from Previous Precedent and
Warns of Negative Impacts
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jacobs argued that the majority
incorrectly changed the standard for when an emergency is an exigent
situation, i.e., an emergency for purposes of removing a child from his or
her parents. 90 His concern stemmed from the majority's "recast[ing of] a
child-welfare emergency in terms of a procedural emergency, i.e.,
whether the danger to the child is so pressing that no court order is
feasible."9' According to Judge Jacobs, the problem with such an
approach is threefold.92 First, the majority does not provide, and indeed
it seems impossible to provide, how a jury could objectively determine if
effecting an emergency removal). Some state statutes use a reasonable cause standard
and, in addition, explicitly require that there be no time to apply for or obtain a court
order. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 907 (2003); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5
(West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2-3(a) (Michie 1997): IOWA CODE ANN. §232.79(1)
(West Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.125(2) (West 1996) (providing that there be
"reasonable cause to believe the harm or threat to life may occur before a juvenile court
could issue a temporary protective custody order or before a juvenile officer could take
the child into protective custody"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:6(I) (2001); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.29(a) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-500(a) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-610(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-12(4) (Michie 1999);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1517(A) (Michie Supp. 2003) (provided that "a court order is not
immediately obtainable"); cf TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104 (Vernon 2002) ("if there is
no time to obtain a temporary restraining order or attachment"). However, the Second
Circuit's holding was unprecedented because it made the new requirement (that state
workers must consider whether there is sufficient time to gain a court order) an outcome-
determinative test to effecting a constitutional emergency removal, as opposed to one of
several factors to be balanced and considered together. See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 596.
88. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 596.
89. See Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (restating the holding of
Tenenbaum).
90. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 607-08 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (articulating the
emergency circumstances standard used in previous cases, and criticizing the majority's
"new and incompatible principle: that there is no such emergency, notwithstanding the
exigency, if there is or may be time to obtain a court order"). Judge Jacobs wrote
separately, concurring in the dismissal of the Tenenbaums' substantive due process and
state law claims, but dissenting from the majority's conclusion that a jury could find a
procedural due process violation, and strongly objecting to the majority's new standard of
review for emergency removal cases. Id. at 607-13 (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 608 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part).
92. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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enough time existed to obtain a court order.'3 Judge Jacobs argued that
requiring such a subjective determination wholly contradicts the Second
Circuit's objective precedent in this area of the law. 4 Second, from an
administrative standpoint, the majority's decision will increase the
workload of courts because nearly every due process challenge to an
emergency child removal will require a jury determination. "  Third,
Judge Jacobs feared that the majority's approach will expose social
workers to liability for their actions, 9" resulting in an increased likelihood
that children will remain in dangerous situations. 7
93. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 608-10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (cautioning against
leaving to juries the "highly subjective determination as to whether there is time to get a
court order"); see supra note 85.
94. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 607-08 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (citing multiple
cases where the court analyzed due process challenges to emergency removals in strictly
objective terms). The dissent points out that the majority cited to Hurlman v. Rice for the
proposition that "in 'emergency circumstances,' a child may be taken into custody by a
responsible state official without court authorization or parental consent." Id. at 607
(noting the majority's citation to Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1991)). Judge
Jacobs then emphasized that "[tihis standard has been applied again and again." Id.
(Jacobs, J., dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 610 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (predicting that summary judgment will
become impossible for the majority of emergency removal cases because social workers'
action or inaction, sometimes the result of bureaucratic delays, will be sufficient to raise
material questions of fact).
96. id. at 610-11 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part). Judge Jacobs noted that incentives
already exist for social workers to err on the side of erroneous failure to remove. Id.
(citing John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 74-78 (1998)). Now, the majority's new requirement has the potential to strip
social workers of their qualified immunity:
Every time a child welfare worker has reason to suspect child abuse, she will
have to consider (i) whether there is reason to believe the child is in imminent
danger (which until now has been all that was required) and (ii) whether there is
time to get to court and obtain a court order (the majority's new requirement) as
well as (iii) whether a court or jury will second-guess that decision on the basis
that more efficient decision-making would have afforded sufficient time to obtain
the court order. In terms of litigation, individual liability and damages, an error
on the side of removal is risky, while an error on the other side is safe.
Id. at 611 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989)); cf Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Tort
Liability of Public Authority for Failure to Remove Parentally Abused or Neglected
Children from Parents' Custody, 60 A.L.R. 4th 942 (1988) (analyzing the different theories
of liability under which one can bring suit against a public authority for negligent failure to
remove a parentally abused or neglected child); CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES SERIES,
REPORTING LAWS: IMMUNITY FOR REPORTERS, available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/
general/legal/statutes/stats02/immun.pdf (updated on May 26, 2004) (containing a recent
compilation and discussion of state statutes that provide immunity for child abuse
reporters).
97. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 611 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part). As a result of this
increased risk of liability, "[tihe incentive will be to allow some number of children-their
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D. Doe v. Kearney-the Eleventh Circuit Explicitly Rejects the Second
Circuit's Approach
On January 18, 2000, the Florida Department of Children and Family
Services ("DCF") learned that T.O., a nine-year-old deaf girl, reported
sexual abuse by her uncle, John Doe, four years earlier.9s T.O. alleged
that when she was five, John Doe made her touch his penis and perform
oral sex.9 DCF assigned the case to social worker Deborah O'Brien.""
O'Brien immediately began her investigation and, after an hour and a
half of research, determined that Doe had a history of sexual crimes.""
Specifically, O'Brien discovered that Doe had been accused of sexually
abusing a three-year-old boy,'0 2 convicted of two counts of lewd and
lascivious behavior,1 3 charged with solicitation of prostitution,' 0 and
accused of rape."' O'Brien talked with her supervisor and DCF's legal
counsel, who advised her to take Doe's three children into custody."'"
After meeting with the Doe family, O'Brien concluded that "the children
were in danger of abuse from John Doe.', 0 7 O'Brien took the children,
constitutional rights preserved-to return home to a predatory adult." Id. (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting in part).
98. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. The record does not indicate whether T.O. was living with her uncle at the
time.
100. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1290. The report stated that the "children in this home
could be at risk. Dad has a history of molesting other children in the past."' Answer Brief
of Appellees at 16, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). Contra Brief for Appellants at 5, Kearney
(No. 02-13874-B) (stating that DCF viewed the report as indicating a "'low to
intermediate"' risk of harm to the children).
101. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1290.
102. Id. O'Brien learned that DCF investigated Doe in 1995, when Doe was accused
of sodomizing a three-year old boy whom Jane Doe was baby-sitting. Despite DCF's
belief in the truth of the allegation, it did not press charges due to "lack of cooperation
from the victim." Id.
103. Id. According to the police report, John Doe was masturbating in his vehicle in
front of two young girls standing at a school bus stop, although Doe claimed he did not
know the girls were nearby. Id. n.6. O'Brien may have misread the report as containing a
conviction for "child fondling," while Doe was actually convicted of fondling himself in
front of children. Id.
104. Id. at 1290.
105. Id. The record does not reflect why Doe was accused of, but not charged with,
rape. Id. Doe was also convicted of four counts of burglary. Id. at 1290 n.5.
106. Id. at 1290. DCF's legal counsel made the recommendation for O'Brien to take
the children into custody at approximately 2:45 p.m. Id.
107. Id. at 1291. At trial, O'Brien testified that during her interview with the Doe
family, she learned the Doe children "did not know good touch [from] bad touch."
Answer Brief of Appellees at 18, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). O'Brien also understood that
"John Doe's pattern of sexual behavior was progressing from strangers to relatives." Id.
In addition, O'Brien felt that Jane Doe "would not protect the children from
communication with their dad over the evening before a court hearing could be held." Id.
11,78 [Vol. 53:1.161
They Took My Child!1
without a court order, to their maternal grandparents' house to spend the
night. "' The next morning, a state judge concluded that there was "a lack
of probable cause" to retain the children any further and ordered them
returned to their parents."' The Does sued, alleging that the statute
under which O'Brien acted violated the Fourteenth Amendment.""
The Eleventh Circuit began its opinion by acknowledging the "general
rule" that the state cannot deprive parents of their liberty interest in the
care and custody of their children without due process, usually in the
form of a hearing."' The court noted the state's profound interest in the
welfare of children and listed cases from various circuits that recognized
the emergency circumstances doctrine in an effort to balance these
conflicting interests."' After disposing of the plaintiff's facial invalidity
challenge, the court addressed the Does' due process claim that the
Florida statute was unconstitutional as applied to them.13
The Florida statute in question permits state workers to effect
emergency removals, without a court order, when the agent has probable
cause to believe that the child is the victim of abuse or is in imminent
danger thereof."14 The Does argued that this statute was unconstitutional
For these reasons, O'Brien determined that an emergency removal was necessary to
protect the children from imminent danger of abuse. Id.
108. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1291.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Does also alleged a Fourth Amendment claim, the analysis of which is
beyond the scope of this Comment. Id. The Does first sought summary judgment.
Answer Brief of Appellees at 14, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). The trial court denied
summary judgment with respect to Florida Statute chapter 39.401(1) because the statute
conditioned pre-judicial removal upon probable cause, and it provided for a hearing
within twenty-four hours of the removal. Answer Brief of Appellees at 14, Kearney (No.
02-13874-B). The court found that "the state's interest in protecting the child outweighed
the parent's [sic] liberty interest and, [given the probable cause and post-removal hearing
provisions], all constitutional mandates had been met." Id.
111. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1293.
112. Id. at 1293-94 (citing Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2001); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000); Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1999); Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739
(10th Cir. 1997); Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994)); cf. United
States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986) (allowing warrantless search
and seizure in criminal cases where exigent circumstances exist). According to the
Kearney court, limiting warrantless removals to true emergencies properly balances the
rights and interests of all parties involved. 329 F.3d at 1294.
113. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1294-95. The statute to which the Does referred was Florida
Statute chapter 39.401(1).
114. FLA. STAT. ch. 39.401(l) (2003). The text of this subsection is as follows:
(1) A child may only be taken into custody.... (b) By a law enforcement officer,
or an authorized agent of the department, if the officer or authorized agent has
probable cause to support a finding: 1. That the child has been abused, neglected,
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as applied to them because it permitted the State to remove their
children when emergency circumstances did not actually exist, thereby
violating the Due Process Clause.' 5 Appellants argued that probable
cause alone was insufficient for removal. The Constitution, they argued,
requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances, i.e., insufficient




The practical effect of arguing that probable cause is inadequate and that
social workers must prove insufficient time to obtain a court order is that
social workers must prove that the child was actually in imminent danger
of abuse and neglect. In other words, the Does were asking the court to
hold that social workers must be correct in their suspicions-that the
abuse must actually exist in order to effect an emergency removal."7 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed that the Constitution requires "such an
inflexible rule."" Although counsel for appellants argued that case law
or abandoned, or is suffering from or is in imminent danger of illness or injury as
a result of abuse, neglect. or abandonment ....
Id. Under this statute, an investigator can seize a child based on probable cause, without
considering whether there is time to obtain a court order. Brief for Appellants at 8,
Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). Deposition testimony of a review specialist and expert in the
Department of Children and Families' policies and practices is illustrative:
Q. Chapter 39.401 authorizes ... the removal of a child from the home without
prior warrant based solely on probable cause to believe the child has been
sexually abused?
A. Correct.
Q. Is there any instance under Chapter 39 where a court order would be
required? Assuming, of course, there is probable cause to believe the child has
been sexually abused.
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. But if the parent simply answers the door and says, oh, here are my children,
then the investigator can simply take the children and leave?
A. Correct.
Q. Without a warrant-without a court order?
A. Without a court order.
Id. at 9 n.9.
115. See Brief for Appellants at 25, 41, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B).
116. See Answer Brief of Appellees at 24-25, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). The Eleventh
Circuit characterized the Does' argument as follows:
They would have us craft a rule that reads something like this: Due process
requires that a state official obtain a court order prior to removing a suspected
victim of child abuse from parental custody, unless: (1) the official has probable
cause to believe the child is in immediate danger of abuse; and (2) the official
reasonably determines that there is insufficient time to obtain judicial permission
before temporarily removing the child.
Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1295.
117. See infra note 184.
118. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1295. The court noted that the flexible doctrine of due
process requires a multifactor examination of all relevant circumstances in a case, not the
fulfillment of a single factor. Id. In addition to due process concerns, this argument raises
1180 [Vol. 53:1161
They Took My Child!8
supported the Does' argument, the Eleventh Circuit stated that none of
the cases, save Tenenbaum, supported appellants' position.'"
The Tenenbaum decision held that a state worker cannot
constitutionally remove a child from her parents' custody without
parental consent or a court order unless the state worker meets two
requirements. 21' The state worker must have probable cause to believe
the child is in imminent danger of abuse or neglect and must believe
there is insufficient time to obtain prior judicial authorization.' 2' The
Eleventh Circuit flatly rejected this more demanding standard. 22 The
court in Kearney cited to the dissenting opinion in Tenenbaum, which
concerns over the realistic capabilities of child protective service (CPS) workers, who
already have complex determinations to make. See supra note 1. During their
investigations of possible child abuse or neglect, these workers "have the difficult tasks of
figuring out what has happened and predicting what will happen." SUMMARY REPORT,
supra note 1. In making these "predictions," CPS workers follow a variety of procedures
and perform multiple tasks. Id. The SUMMARY REPORT provides:
When asked whether procedures would "always," "sometimes," "rarely," or
"never" be followed, more than two-thirds of agencies in the Nation were
estimated to "always" include the following activities during an investigation:
[c]onsider the severity of the case: [c]onsider required standards of evidence;
[r]eview prior CPS records; [i]nterview or formally observe children; interview
caregivers; [clonsult with available clinicians, domestic violence specialists,
substance abuse specialists, and child fatality teams; [n]otify the perpetrator, if
abuse or neglect was founded; and [a]dd the perpetrator's name to the Central
Registry.
Id. CPS workers use these activities to make the best possible prediction as to whether the
child is in an emergency situation. Id. It seems highly irrational to require CPS workers to
determine that there is insufficient time to obtain a court order before they can
constitutionally remove a child from parental custody. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text (paraphrasing the holding in Tenenbaum, which requires case workers
to determine that there is insufficient time to obtain a court order before removing a child
in emergency circumstances).
119. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1295-96 (pointing out that, with the exception of Tenenbaum
v. Williams, these cases only require probable cause to believe the child is in imminent
danger for a state worker to effect a constitutional emergency removal, without the
additional requirement of insufficient time to obtain a court order) (citing Roska v.
Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 2002); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000,
1020 (7th Cir. 2000): Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997); Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also Mabe v. San Bernadino
County, Dep't of Public Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001); Wallis v. Spencer, 202
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986); Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson,
15 F.3d 333, 344 (4th Cir. 1994); Brief for Appellants at 17-21, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B)
(citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987).
120. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594-95.
121. Id.
122. See Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1296-98 (describing the facts and procedural history of
Tenenbaum and rejecting the majority's reasoning in adopting the requirement that there
be insufficient time to obtain a court order).
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warned that Tenenbaum marked a "dramatic departure from previous
Second Circuit precedent.' 23  The Eleventh Circuit stated that due
process is a flexible doctrine requiring a balancing of the many factors
and interests at stake, not reliance on one outcome-determinative
factor. 
24
II. THE FALLOUT FROM THE TENENBA UM-KEARNEY CONFLICT- A
CLOSER LOOK AT THE VARIOUS ANALYTICAL APPROACHES
A. Why the Second Circuit's Reasoning Is Misplaced
The Second Circuit in Tenenbaum disagreed with the district court that
the removal of Sarah Tenenbaum was "an appropriate response to a
legitimately perceived emergency. ,125  The court of appeals also
disagreed that the state agent had probable cause, that is, "an objectively




However, even if probable cause existed, the Second Circuit demanded a
higher standard.127  Further analysis of the majority opinion in
Tenenbaum reveals the flaw in the court's reasoning.
One reason to discount the Second Circuit's due process analysis is the
court's apparent misunderstanding of the "reasonable" or "probable
•128
cause" requirement. The court characterized the probable cause
standard in emergency circumstances cases as an "infinite license" for the
state and its agents to remove children from their parents' custody.
29
Not only is the Second Circuit the first to characterize "probable cause"
as an "infinite license," but decades of appellate decisions demonstrate
that probable cause is a strict, objective standard that comports with due
process• Accordingly, the Second Circuit's position that probable
123. Id. at 1297; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
124. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1297-98 (criticizing the approach of "simply asking whether
there was time to get a warrant," and recommending "a careful balancing of [all] interests
at stake"); see also supra note 15.
125. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594 (quoting Tenenbaum v. Williams, 826 F. Supp. 962,
970 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (disagreeing that Williams' probable cause "was enough ... as a matter of
law" to satisfy the emergency circumstances doctrine and permit Sarah's removal without
a court order).
128. See id. at 595; see also infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
129. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 595.
130. See id. at 607-08 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part); see also Gottlieb v. County of
Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It is established ... that government officials
may remove a child from his or her parents' custody before a hearing is held where there
is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a threat to the child's health or safety is
imminent."); Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1992); Robison v. Via,
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cause is constitutionally insufficient for emergency removals is
defective.'
Furthermore, prior decisions of federal courts of appeal, including
those cited by the majority in Tenenbaum, do not support the position
that emergency removals necessitate anything more than probable
cause. 3 2  As described above, the emergency circumstances doctrine
evolved to protect the rights of children in the face of the strong
constitutional protection of parental rights in the care and custody of
their children.' 3 Although Supreme Court precedent in family law such
as Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Parham v. J.R. ,' 3 Stanley v. Illinois,'36 and
Troxel v. Granville137 create a strong presumption in favor of the parents'
decisions, the Second Circuit could not rely on such cases in its modified
due process analysis because these cases are not applicable to emergency
821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[1]t is sufficient if the officials have been presented with
evidence of serious ongoing abuse and therefore have reason to fear imminent
recurrence."); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1977); Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (3rd Cir. 1997)
(holding that the state may remove a child without a court order upon reasonable cause to
believe a child is in imminent danger of abuse).
131. An examination of state statutes nationwide supports this conclusion. Several
state statutes, including New York's, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417(1)(a) (McKinney 2003),
explicitly allow peace officers, police officers, child protection workers, and others to
remove children from their parents' custody without parental consent or a court order
based on reasonable cause or a similar standard. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
306(a)(2) (Deering 2001) (reasonable cause); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101g(c)
(West Supp. 2003) (probable cause); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2309(a)(3) (2003) (reasonable
grounds); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(1)(b) (West 2003) (probable cause); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-45(a)(4) (2003) (reasonable grounds); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1527(b) (2002)
(probable cause): KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.040(5)(c) (Michie Supp. 2002) (reasonable
grounds); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621 (West 2003) (reasonable grounds); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 51B(3) (West 2003) (reasonable cause); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260C.175(b)(2) (West 2003) (reasonable belief); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-303(1)(b)
(2003) (probable cause); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-301(1) (Supp. 2003) (reason to
believe); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.390(1)(a) (Michie 2002) (reasonable cause); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-6(A)(1) (Michie 2003) (reasonable grounds); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6324(3) (West Supp. 2003) (reasonable grounds); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5(b), (d)
(1997) (reasonable cause); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-113(3), -114(a)(2) (2001)
(reasonable grounds and probable cause, respectively): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5510(3)
(1991) (reasonable grounds): WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.050(1)(b) (West 2002)
(reasonable belief): W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3(c) (Michie 2003) (probable cause); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.19(1)(d)(5) (West 2003) (reasonable grounds); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-
405(a)(i) (Michie 2003) (reasonable grounds).
132. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part I.A-B, D.
134. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
135. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
136. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
137. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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circumstances situations. 11 Illustrative of this is Troxel, one of the more
modern cases in this area, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children,
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children .... [There is a]
traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child.""
Troxel, which relied upon Parham, Stanley, and Pierce, therefore does
not apply to emergency circumstances cases because the nature of these
situations rebuts the presumption that a parent is fit.'
40
138. The majority of Supreme Court precedent in the area of family law is
distinguishable from Tenenbaum because these cases do not involve situations where the
Court could assume that the parents' interests contradicted the child's. See, e.g., Parham,
442 U.S. 584; Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court regularly assumes in these cases that the child's best interest is to remain with the
parents. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (implying that the best interest of the child lies first
with fit parents). In Stanley, the Court rejected an Illinois statute on the basis that it
unconstitutionally presumed that unwed fathers were unfit parents, and that the statute
"needlessly risk[ed] running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child" by ignoring the premise that it is in the child's best interest to remain with his
parents unless the parents are proved unfit in a court hearing. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650,
657-58. In Parham, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what
a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.
442 U.S. at 602. This presumption, that the parent acts in the best interest of the child, is
immediately challenged in a situation involving child abuse. Id. Troxel's holding is
grounded in the historical model of legal analysis. 530 U.S. 57, 65-66. The Court in Troxel
held that the judiciary should continue to grant material weight to parents' determinations
of what is in the best interest of their child because, historically, this Nation has recognized
that the care, concern, and management of children is a fundamental right of parents
protected by the Constitution. Id. at 66; cf Joel R. Brandes & Carole L. Weidman, An
Abused Child's Emergency Removal from Home, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 1996, at
http://www.brandeslaw.com/child-abuse/abusedchild-emergency.remova.htm. Brandes
and Weidman argue,
While parents have a right to raise their children as they see fit, they must do so
within reason and with an eye toward the good of the child. Parents have an
affirmative obligation to protect their children. If they fail to meet that
obligation, the state can and will intervene to protect them.
Id.
139. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
140. Id. at 66, 69, 77. It is axiomatic that a parent who is suspected of abusing or
neglecting his child to the extent necessary to satisfy probable cause is simultaneously
suspected not to be acting in the best interests of his or her child. See supra text
accompanying note 139. Justice Stevens' dissent in Troxel implies that under the
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The Second Circuit cited Stanley v. Illinois 41 in support of an
additional requirement to make emergency removals comport with due
process, but its reliance on Stanley was misplaced. 42 The quoted passage
from Stanley reads, "[tihe establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest
worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the





Indeed, one could argue that the Constitution does not merely recognize,
but elevates, the values our nation places on the welfare of our children,
particularly children's freedom from abuse and neglect, over efficiency of
state procedures.1 44 The Stanley court argued that the doctrine of due
process was designed to trump administrative convenience in favor of
protecting our "vulnerable" citizens. Accordingly, Stanley does not
support the Tenenbaum majority's argument that emergency removals (a
practice which affects very vulnerable citizens) require any additional
emergency circumstances doctrine, reasonable suspicion of abuse or neglect rebuts the
parental presumption and the corresponding due process protections granted to parents:
Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in
caring for and guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest-
absent exceptional circumstances-in doing so without the undue interference of
strangers to them and to their child. Moreover, and critical in this case, our cases
applying this principle have explained that with this constitutional liberty comes
a presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) that "natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children."
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Imminent danger of abuse or neglect fits
snugly within the "exceptional circumstances" mentioned by Justice Stevens. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Because these exceptional circumstances rebut the presumption
that parents are acting in the best interest of their children, id. (Stevens, J., dissenting),
parents whose children are deemed to be in emergency circumstances will not receive the
typical due process protection that accompanies a presumption of fitness. See discussion
supra note 138; cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (supporting the assertion that
the law provides for situations when the welfare of the child predominates over the
interests of the parents). In Schall, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[clhildren, by definition,
are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be
subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play
its part as parens patriae." Id.
141. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
142. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581,595 (2d Cir. 1999).
143. Id.
144. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656. The Court in Stanley stated:
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that
may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.
Id.
145. See id. at 657; see also supra note 144.
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element in order to comport with administrative convenience or due
1W6process.
1. The Tenenbaum Majority's Definition of Emergency Is Circular
The majority in Tenenbaum held that in order to have a constitutional
emergency removal, the social worker must demonstrate that there is
insufficient time to obtain prior judicial authorization. 14 7 Yet the only
guidance the court provided was that if there was sufficient time to
obtain a court order, then there was no emergency. 4" Thus, the court's
holding is tautological and finds no support in case law.149  The
emergency circumstances doctrine exists for situations where the
application of normal due process requirements, such as obtaining
judicial authorization, becomes impractical because a child's welfare is in
danger-it exists as an exception to typical due process requirements.""
To say that there will be some situations where the child is in imminent
danger, but not imminent enough to forgo obtaining judicial
authorization, without providing any guidance as to where to draw this
elusive line, undermines the purpose of an emergency circumstances
.... 151
doctrine with circular, unintelligible constraints.
2. Circuits Have Refused to Adopt Tenenbaum's Holding-Wallis,
Brokaw, and Mabe
Four months after the Second Circuit decided Tenenbaum, the Ninth
Circuit decided Wallis v. Spencer.5 2 At issue in this case was whether
state officials had reasonable cause to believe that an emergency existed,
thus warranting the removal of the Wallis children without a court
146. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657; see also supra note 144.
147. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594-95.
148. Id. at 594 ("If the danger to the child is not so imminent that there is reasonably
sufficient time to seek prior judicial authorization, ex parte or otherwise, for the child's
removal, then the circumstances are not emergent .... "); see also supra notes 85, 93 and
accompanying text.
149. Id. As support for its new holding, the court cites Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784,
792-93 (10th Cir. 1993) (proposing that the welfare of the child is a multifaceted concern.
which includes the child's relationship to the family). Tenenbaum. 193 F.3d at 595.
However, Franz in no way undercuts the Tenenbaum court's admission that "when child
abuse is asserted, the child's welfare predominates over other interests of her parents and
the State." Id. The fact that Franz contemplates the welfare of the child as "multifaceted"
brings it closer in line with the Eleventh Circuit's view of due process as a flexible doctrine
that requires a balancing of multiple factors. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2003); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
151. See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 607-11 (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part).
152. 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1999).
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order. '  Although the State claimed it had reasonable cause based on
the report of Mrs. Wallis' sister, 5 4 the court set out existing case law to
elucidate the boundaries of reasonable cause '-s and determined that a
jury could find that the officers did not have reasonable cause to remove
the Wallis children prior to gaining judicial authorization.1 6 Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit chose not to adopt Tenenbaum's additional
requirement in due process assessments of emergency child removals."7
A year later, the Ninth Circuit had another opportunity to incorporate
Tenenbaum's "sufficient time to obtain a court order" test, but chose not
to do so in Mabe v. San Bernardino County.'58 A strong inference, then,
may be drawn that the Ninth Circuit felt Tenenbaum's holding
unnecessary.
Ten months later, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to adopt the
Tenenbaum approach in Brokaw v. Mercer County."9  Here, upon
reaching the age of majority, the plaintiff alleged that state actors
153. Id. at 1137-38. The court began its constitutional analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment by acknowledging the constitutional right of parents and children to live
together free from governmental interference. Id. at 1136. The court then cited the well-
established exception to this right: the case of emergency circumstances. Id. at 1136-37
(citing Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
154. Id. at 1131-40. This woman had a history of psychiatric problems. Id. She
previously reported falsely that Mr. Wallis sexually abused his daughter. Id. In this
instance, she reported that Mr. Wallis was in a satanic cult and planned to sacrifice his son
to Satan. Id.
155. Id. at 1138. The court explained:
First, the state may not remove children from their parents' custody without a
court order unless there is specific, articulable evidence that provides reasonable
cause to believe that a child is in imminent danger of abuse. Moreover, the
police cannot seize children suspected of being abused or neglected unless
reasonable avenues of investigation are first pursued, particularly where it is not
clear that a crime has been-or will be-committed. Whether a reasonable
avenue of investigation exists, however, depends in part upon the time element
and the nature of the allegations.
Id.; see also Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1991) (warning of the negative
consequences that would result if the "mere possibility" of danger constituted an
emergency).
156. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1140.
157. See id. at 1141-42 n.12 (The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited to
Tenenbaum, but only with respect to the issue of requiring a warrant before subjecting
minor children to invasive medical examinations.).
158. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cit. 2001)
(citing to Wallis for the proposition that government officials cannot intrude on a parent's
custody of her child without prior judicial authorization unless there is "reasonable cause
to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope
of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury," but declining to add
that government officials must also consider whether there is sufficient time, consistent
with the child's safety, to obtain such judicial authorization).
159. 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
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conspired with members of his family to forcibly remove him and his
sister from his parents' house without a court order."' On appeal, the
court analyzed whether the plaintiff could prevail on due process
claims.16 ' The court cited to Tenenbaum five times in its opinion, but not
once with respect to procedural due process. 16 That is, when the court
discussed its decision to remand on the issue of procedural due process, it
made no mention of Tenenbaum's "sufficient time to seek judicial
authorization" test. 63  The fact that the court accepted many
propositions in Tenenbaum yet was silent on the new Tenenbaum test
implies an unwillingness to adopt the new requirement.
Wallis, Brokaw, and Mabe are just three examples of circuits that
chose not to adopt the rationale in Tenenbaum.'64 Taken as a whole, the
case law subsequent to Tenenbaum and prior to Kearney made it clear
that Tenenbaum was an aberration in this area of the law. 16 By August
18, 2004, courts had cited to the Tenenbaum decision 153 times. 66 Of
these, only one court followed Tenenbaum to add another prerequisite to
removal in emergency circumstances.16  The fact that only one court
160. Id. at 1006-07.
161. Id. at 1017-22. The court also analyzed the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim,
but that is beyond the scope of this Comment. Id. at 1009-17.
162. See id. at 1010, 1022-23 (referencing Tenenbaum during its analysis of plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment claim and defendant's qualified immunity defense, but omitting any
reference to Tenenbaum in its procedural due process analysis).
163. See id. at 1020-22.
164. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 167-68, 170.
166. Tenenbaum v. Williams, No. 97-9488, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25518 (2d Cir. Oct.
13, 1999) (containing citing references in Shepard's report).
167. Velez v. Reynolds, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14129, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 10, 2004)
("Tenenbaum held that an '"emergency" removal' would be warranted only if ACS did
not have sufficient time consistent with the child's safety, to obtain prior court
authorization."). Six other decisions followed Tenenbaum, but for other reasons. See
Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2002) (adhering to Tenenbaum's
Fourth Amendment analysis, justifying warrantless seizures in exigent circumstances);
Hogan v. Conn. Judicial Branch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 111, 123 (D. Conn. 2002) (adhering to
Tenenbaum's substantive due process analysis, "[w]here a particular Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); New York v. Moulds Holding Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Tenenbaum for the applicable standard of review of a summary judgment decision,
that the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party);
People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 292 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (following Tenenbaum's substantive due process analysis, that "[s]ubstantive due-
process rights guard against the government's 'exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective"') (citation omitted);
Hamad v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 191 F. Supp. 2d 286, 302-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
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(within the Second Circuit's controlling jurisdiction) followed
Tenenbaum on procedural due process grounds weakens the authority of
the Tenenbaum approach."
3. Tenenbaum-a True Circuit Split with Kearney, or a Response to
the Outrageous Facts of the Case?
Although the two circuits pronounced two different rules of law,
several observations suggest that Tenenbaum is not a valid approach.
First, Second Circuit case law did not foreshadow in any way the bold
step that the court made in Tenenbaum.6 9 Second, since Tenenbaum was
decided, only one court has followed its emergency removal analysis.'
7
'
Third, Tenenbaum appears to be a judicial overreaction to outrageous
circumstances. 7' Counsel for the Tenenbaums persuasively captured the
shocking nature of the facts of this case in its appellate brief:
Sarah Tenenbaum, a developmentally delayed five-year-old
girl, was removed from her parents and subjected to a body
cavity search as a result of a discredited report made by an
inexperienced teacher .... Sarah was removed, not to protect
her from immediate danger, but in order to conduct a strip
search of her most private body parts. The course chosen by
defendants -having a stranger summarily remove the girl from
school and take her to a city hospital emergency room-was the
most traumatic method of obtaining information, the most
intrusive ... and was nothing more than a shocking display of
raw governmental authority.
(adhering to Tenenbaum's analysis of plaintiff's deprivation of rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, agreeing that the plaintiff must identify a particular custom adopted by the
municipality under which the injury arose to "'ensur[e] that a municipality is held liable
only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative
body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality"')
(citation omitted); Galante v. County of Nassau, 720 N.Y.S. 2d 325, 327-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2000) (relying heavily on Tenenbaum in its analysis of defendant's qualified immunity
defense).
168. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
170. See Velez, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14129, at *26; see supra notes 166-68 and
accompanying text. It is possible that other courts researching this area of the law do not
view Tenenbaum as a valid approach to adopt-as an alternative to the approach in
Kearney-but rather as a random aberration among the established case law in all other
circuits.
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
172. Brief for Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 12, Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581
(2d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-9488). The trial court noted that while "Sarah probably would have
been subjected to essentially the same type of physical examinati6n" even with a court
order, "there are compelling reasons to believe that the emotional distress experienced by
Sarah on that date would have been significantly ameliorated had appropriate procedures
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This shocking story may explain the Second Circuit's reaction.173 Finally,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Tenenbaum 74 and recently
denied certiorari in Doe v. Kearney.'75 It is possible that the Court simply
did not see evidence of a true Tenenbaum/Kearney split among the
various circuits.176
B. Kearney Properly Applied Existing Constitutional Law to the Facts;
A Proper Definition of Emergency Leads to a Proper Application of the
Emergency Circumstances Doctrine
In contrast to the Second Circuit in Tenenbaum, the Eleventh Circuit
in Kearney properly applied case law to support its definition of
"emergency.' ' 77  Kearney defined "emergency" synonymously with
"exigency" and "imminent danger," and noted that courts use these
terms nterchangeably. Kearney followed established case law by
holding that "reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent
danger" constitutes an emergency.179
It follows that because the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Second
Circuit on how to define the term "emergency"-a fundamental concept
to the correct application of the emergency circumstances doctrine-it
would also disagree on the due process requirements involved in the
emergency removal of children. ... The court in Kearney acknowledged
that "cases simply recognize-as we do-that a state may not remove a
child from parental custody without judicial authorization unless there is
been followed." Id. at 18. The court wrote, "[Sarah's] mother, or another trusted
individual, could have provided reassurance to the child prior to the examination." Id.
173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174. See City of New York v. Tenenbaum, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
175. Doe v. Reiger, 124 S. Ct. 389 (2003).
176. In reality, there is no inconsistency -circuits consistently reject the Tenenbaum
approach. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
177. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2003) (implying that the main
distinction between the approach taken in Tenenbaum and the approach taken by the
court in Kearney "boils down to how we define an emergency").
178. Id. at 1294 n.10.
179. Id. For support, Kearney cited to Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101,
1106 (9th Cir. 2001), a case holding that reasonable cause to believe a child is in imminent
danger is sufficient grounds for a government official to remove a child from parental
custody without judicial authorization. Id. Though the Kearney court also cited to
Tenenbaum for its definition of emergency, id. ("'In emergency circumstances a child may
be taken into custody by a responsible State official without court authorization or
parental consent."'), the majority in Tenenbaum borrowed that quotation from Hurlman
v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1991). Therefore, the court in Kearney did not rely on
Tenenbaurn for its definition of emergency, but merely included other, prior case law from
the Second Circuit as the foundation for its definition. See Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1294 n.10.
180. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1297 n.13 (disagreeing with the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's decision of "how emergency circumstances should be defined").
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probable cause to believe the child is threatened with imminent harm."' ...
By allowing "probable cause" and "imminent danger" to enter into the
definition of "emergency," the Eleventh Circuit found a way to apply the
emergency circumstances doctrine in a manner consistent with its view
that due process is a "flexible concept.' ', 2  The Eleventh Circuit's
definition of "emergency" allows it to determine what process is due by
weighing multiple factors involved in individual cases, a "subtle
balancing" consistent with Supreme Court precedent'8 3 that would be
thwarted by the Second Circuit's "simply asking whether there was time
to get a warrant."'' 4
III. WHY THE EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT
INCORPORATE THE TENENBA UM REQUIREMENT
A. The Additional Tenenbaum Requirement Would Swallow the
Emergency Circumstances Exception
If "insufficient time to obtain a court order" became a prerequisite to
emergency removal in addition to "lack of probable cause of imminent
danger," it would defeat the emergency circumstances doctrine."" This
181. Id. at 1295 (citing multiple cases to illustrate how the emergency circumstances
doctrine allows for an exception to typical due process requirements). These cases include
Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001), and Brokaw v. Mercer
County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000). Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1293.
182. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1297 (emphasizing the importance of maintaining flexibility
in due process analysis "particularly where the well-being of children is concerned"). But
cf Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1999) (Jacobs, J., dissenting in
part) (using terms such as "reasonable" cause and "imminent" danger to assess due
process challenges to emergency removals, but emphasizing that these are objective
terms).
183. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
184. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1297-98. In Doe v. Kearney, the appellees presented another
argument against making outcome-determinative the decision of whether there is
sufficient time to obtain a warrant before effecting an emergency removal. Answer Brief
of Appellees at 26-27, Kearney (No. 02-13874-B). According to the appellees:
A case worker in the field must have the flexibility to make this snap decision
where there is a sufficient basis to conclude that the child's safety is threatened
without the concern of whether he or she will be sued for taking such action in
the event a judicial officer later decides there was a lack of evidence to support
the concern.
Id. Essentially, they argued that the only other way a caseworker could avoid this concern
about being sued, under the Tenenbaum requirement, would be if the caseworker was
positive that the evidence did support her concern of abuse. See id.
185. Cf Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the city human services department's refusal to allow a mother or her attorney to
participate in an emergency child custody hearing did not violate due process, even though
the mother and her attorney were available). The court explained:
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exception to typical due process protection allows state workers to
remove a child when probable cause exists to suspect imminent danger of
abuse 1116 Some emergency removal statutes require a court hearing to
retain the child after findings of abuse are confirmed. 7 Other statutes
require the state to release the child back into the custody of his parents
immediately upon discovery of an unfounded allegation."' These
statutes recognize that state workers may effect emergency removals
based on probable cause that the child is in danger of abuse, not absolute
certainty; if state workers had to be certain of children's danger, then
provisions regarding unfounded suspicions would be surplussage.'8 9
We do not discount parents' strong interest in the custody of their children, but
requiring that a parent or his attorney be included in emergency pre-deprivation
hearings "when available" or "when at hand" would build delay into these time-
sensitive hearings and encourage litigation over "availability." Such a
requirement would thus inhibit, deter and, at times, subvert the crucial function
of ex parte custody hearings -protecting children who are in imminent danger of
harm.
Id. at 374.
186. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1977).
187. See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Child Abuse and Neglect: A National Summary of
State Statutes, 48 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 41, 45 (1997). Authors Gatowski and Springgate
explain:
While most states refer to "an emergency hearing," this hearing is referred to in
some jurisdictions as a "shelter care hearing," "preliminary protective hearing,"
or "temporary custody hearing." Despite differences in terminology, the states'
statutes construe these hearings in a similar manner as the more typical
"emergency hearing" at which the court reviews the sufficiency of cause for
involuntary removal of the child from the home. [Several] state statutes ...
[mandate] time frames for a hearing to occur immediately before or immediately
after the child is removed from home in an emergency ....
Id. Washington, D.C., Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wyoming and all require an emergency hearing between twenty-four hours and ten days
of removal. Id.; see also, e.g., Colleen Jenkins, DCF Must Justify Moving Elderly, ST.
PETERSBURG TiMES, April 1, 2003, 2003 WL 10615133 (reporting that in Florida, after
DCF removes a child, it must appear before a judge to defend its action within twenty-four
hours).
188. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 39.401(3) (West 2003). The statute provides:
If the child is taken into custody by, or is delivered to, an authorized agent of the
department, the authorized agent shall review the facts supporting the removal
with an attorney representing the department. The purpose of this review shall
be to determine whether probable cause exists for the filing of a shelter petition.
If the facts are not sufficient to support the filing of the shelter petition, the child
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Furthermore, probable cause to suspect that the child is in imminent
danger rebuts the presumption that the parents are fit.'' This is yet
another reason why, in the context of emergency circumstances, parental
due process rights cannot receive normal protection.'9 ' Any other
interpretation, including that of the majority in Tenenbaum, would
abolish the probable cause standard and swallow up the emergency
circumstances doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Removing a child from parental custody without judicial authorization,
under emergency circumstances, does not violate parents' procedural due
process rights. As the Eleventh Circuit held in Kearney, an emergency
exists any time a state worker has reasonable cause to suspect that the
child is in imminent danger of abuse or neglect.'92 To say that an
emergency exists only when there is insufficient time to obtain a court
order not only misunderstands the nature of exigent circumstances, but
it also undercuts the constitutional protection that children's welfare
deserves. Across the Nation, facially valid statutes and clear case law
allow states to intervene in family situations without compromising
parents' rights or caseworkers' ability to perform their duties.' 93 These
statutes balance the interests of the parents, state, and child, while
considering the exigent circumstances under which emergency removals194
occur. The balancing of all relevant factors allows an exception to
typical due process analysis, which courts should continue to apply,
without regard to the anomaly of Tenenbaum v. Williams.
190. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
192. See Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
193. See supra note 65.
194. See Miller, supra note 65.
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